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This contribution aims to sketch how a single article published in a legal journal came to influence 
generations of international lawyers worldwide, despite not being a very good article, and despite 
its main proposition not being supported by much empirical evidence. The article concerns is 
James Fawcett’s ‘The Legal Character of International Agreements’, published in 1953 in the 
British Yearbook of International Law, which more or less single-handedly invented the (binding, 
but ostensibly not legally binding) Memorandum of Understanding. This contributions traces 
Fawcett’s forerunners, dissects his argumentation, and scrutinizes its reception in both the 
academy and the practice of Foreign Office lawyers. It does so in order to illustrate how power can 
be shaped through epistemic means and can be exercised even by academics, in this case by 
means of a journal article. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Students of international affairs are increasingly aware that governance is not merely the province 
of formal decision-making processes, but can take place in many different ways and by many 
different people. Some of these people may be endowed with formal governance powers (heads 
of state or government, e.g., or members of government). Others may be less well-endowed with 
formal prerogatives but still generally seen as wielding governance powers: think only of the 
captains of industry involved in Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex, or of the sort of norm 
entrepeneurs identified as playing an influential role in the development of human rights.2 
A category increasingly scrutinized is formed by so-called ‘experts’, although the label is not 
always uniformly applied. For some, the relevant experts are typically (or mostly) bureaucrats 
involved in the work of intergovernmental institutions;3 others encompass also those working for 
non-governmental agencies,4 and yet others think of experts even more broadly (and probably too 
broadly) as everyone giving their opinions for a fee.5   
In what follows, I aim to tell a peculiar story about how a single individual international lawyer – 
an expert, by any standard - in a position of no formal authority managed to shift the boundaries 
of the possible in international law-making. This was not a towering intellectual like Vitoria or 
Grotius or Gentili or, later, like Kelsen or Lauterpacht. Instead, the international lawyer concerned 
was James Fawcett, and his contribution concerned an influential (very influential), though not 
particularly good, article on the legal character of international agreements.  I trace Fawcett’s 
influence on the way international lawyers have come to think about treaties and what have been 
called informal agreements6 or, in terms most often used by international lawyers, Memoranda of 
Understanding. These have become very popular instruments for the conduct of international 
affairs, whose use is ‘widespread’.7 
                                                        
2 For useful general discussion, see Maarten A. Hajer, Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the Age of 
Mediatization, 2009.  
3 Monika Ambrus et al. (eds), The Role of Experts in International and European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, 
Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors?, 2014; David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise 
Shape Global Political Economy, 2016. 
4 Ole Jacob Sending, The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance, 2017. 
5 Roger Koppl, Expert Failure, 2018. 
6 See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, International Organization 45 (1991) 
495 et seq. 
7 The characterization is by Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn, 2007, 38. 
That individuals can exercise power in international affairs is as such not a particularly innovative 
observation: Max Weber already pointed to the role of charisma in political leadership,8 while Fred 
Greenstein later did much to conceptualize the role of personality in politics.9 It would seem to be 
generally accepted that much the same can apply to global governance,10 and libraries are filled 
with historical works on individual statesmen (usually men) and their impact.  What may be less 
often realized is the impact (influence, power) exercised by individuals through epistemic means, 
and that those individuals may include academics.11 This influence will rarely be a direct influence 
on policy: few governments will change direction on the advice of an international law professor 
pointing out that their behavior may be illegal, or on advice of an economics professor who 
suggests that policy may be counter-productive. The power wielded, by contrast, is more likely to 
be indirect and somewhat ephemeral, but for that no less real, as it may ‘work on people’s 
conceptions of reality.’12  
In some fields of knowledge, the influence of individuals is generally recognized. Economists are 
well aware of the formative influence of someone like John Maynard Keynes on the way we think 
about macro-economics and government spending, and economists typically receive Nobel prizes 
for breakthroughs and have theorems named after them. Keynes himself repeatedly suggested 
much the same, dedicating his 1920 classic The Economic Consequences of the Peace to the 
intentional ‘formation of the general opinion of the future’, in a quest to influence public opinion. 
He was convinced that the future depended not on the acts of statesmen, but on ‘instruction and 
imagination’13 or, as he put it a decade and a half later, on the insights of economists and political 
philosophers.14 
Things are less obvious with international lawyers, who may fit into earlier established categories 
(in that someone may be labelled a Grotian, or a Kantian, or even both), but whose contributions 
are rarely singled out in individual terms. Different schools of thought may exist and may revolve 
around a handful of individuals (the New Haven approach around McDougal, Reisman and 
                                                        
8 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Gunther Roth/Klaus Wittich eds., 1978. 
9 Fred I. Greenstein, The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush, American Political 
Science Review 61 (1967) 629 et seq. 
10 Deborah Avant/Martha Finnemore/Susan K. Sell (eds), Who Governs the Globe?, 2010. 
11 An early forerunner is the important, if somewhat neglected, study by Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of 
Politics, 1985 [1964]. 
12 Pertti Alasuutari/Ali Qadir, Epistemic Governance: An Approach to the Politics of Policy-Making, European Journal of 
Cultural and Political Sociology 1 (2014) 67 et seq. 
13 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920, 279 and 278, respectively. 
14 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, 1970 [1936], 383-384. 
Lasswell; the critical approach around Kennedy and Koskenniemi and Orford perhaps), but it is rare 
for important breakthroughs to be associated with single individuals, and it is rare for individuals 
to be associated with specific topics as opposed to general approaches: there may a Charlesworth 
approach to international law in general, but there is no Benvenisti theorem on occupation law, or 
a Milanovic postulate on extraterritorial jurisdiction, or a Vinuales axiom on investment and 
environment, nor is there such a thing as Posner optimality or a Goldsmith equilibrium in 
international law. This probably owes much to the way academic disciplines are structured and 
whether new insights come to replace existing insights or exist alongside them, but the takeaway 
should not be that international lawyers are incapable of exercising epistemic influence. And while 
epistemic communities by definition work as communities, within these communities some will 
have a more prominent position than others; the work of some will have a greater impact than 
that of others. While it would be nonsense to claim that Fawcett imposed his trouvaille of the non-
legally binding instrument on his colleagues and on practitioners at Foreign Ministries, it would 
seem by no means absurd to suggest that his article struck a nerve, and functioned at the very 
least as a catalyst, formulating a proposition that was, so to speak, waiting to be formulated. 
Fawcett formulated an insight that fell into fertile soil and came to be embraced by Foreign 
Ministry lawyers; equally though, those lawyers could not have proceeded the way they have 
without Fawcett’s contribution, and it is at least arguable that it were precisely Fawcett’s 
experiences and sensibilities that brought him to the central argument of his article. Put 
differently, Fawcett’s contemporaries might not have thought of quite the same argument. 
Lauterpacht or McNair or Fitzmaurice would, in all likelihood, not have written this article - not in 
the same way, at any rate. 
What makes Fawcett’s example even more interesting is that his influential piece is actually not a 
very good piece, and would have been be unlikely to pass any serious peer review screening of the 
sort that is common today. Fawcett makes a number of claims that are unsubstantiated and 
incoherent, turning then-existing knowledge on its head. He proposed a thesis that is 
unpersuasive on theoretical grounds and not supported by much empirical evidence, least of all 
the sort of empirical evidence that usually counts among lawyers: the dicta of courts and tribunals. 
Even state practice, not a very suitable empirical correspondent for conceptual work to begin 
with, was hardly supportive when he wrote, although it has come to represent the one pillar on 
which current argumentation rests. And yet, his has been a singularly influential work, followed by 
many states and most academics writing on the topic, and without Fawcett occupying the sort of 
official position that would make his influence understandable: he did not, at the time of his 
writing, occupy any formal position which would cloth him with institutional authority. Put 
differently, it is one thing for special rapporteurs writing for the International Law Commission to 
stamp their individual authority on a topic, in the manner of James Crawford on the law of state 
responsibility, or Giorgio Gaja on the responsibility of international organizations. But it is quite 
another thing for a lone academic to exercise this kind of influence not just within the academy 
but also on the conduct of international affairs. 
Fawcett’s article paved the way for the immense popularity of memoranda of understanding as 
instruments for the conduct of international affairs. Such MoUs are often said not to give rise to 
legal commitments under international law, but rather to de-activate the workings of international 
law: they are thought to give rise merely to political commitments or ‘politically binding’ 
agreements, and occasionally also to morally binding agreements. Terminology is not quite 
uniform, and Fawcett further confused matters considerably when he wrote, without further 
explication or substantiation - neither legal nor philosophical - that ‘[p]olitical obligations stand in 
the same relation to legal obligations, arising under inter-State agreements, as moral obligations 
between individuals stand to private law contracts.’15 This effectively equates morality and 
politics, suggesting that what constitutes morality in private relations qualifies as politics among 
states – a questionable proposition from any perspective. Be that as it may, the idea uniting 
various labels and positions is the negative idea that whatever else they may represent, MoUs are 
devoid of legal force: they are supposed to bind the states concluding them, but are not supposed 
to do so as a matter of law. Hence, they are said not to give rise to legal rights or legal obligations, 
and one cannot rely on them before a court or other law-applying agency. Instead, the binding 
force of MoUs is said to operate somewhere in the spheres of politics or morality, and these two 
labels are often used interchangeably.16 
Their proponents often suggest that MoUs are convenient instruments of foreign policy: they can 
speedily be concluded, so it is claimed, and are supposedly more flexible in their operation than 
regular, legally binding treaties. And since they are not to be considered as regular treaties, they 
                                                        
15 J.E.S. Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements, British Yearbook of International Law 30 (1953) 381 
et seq., 398-399. 
16 The literature is voluminous, and well-known contributions include, in addition to the references elsewhere in this 
article, Richard R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 29 
(1980) 549 et seq.; Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-legal Norms – A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations? 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 11 (1980) 65 et seq.; and Kelvin Widdows, What is an Agreement in 
International Law?, British Yearbook of International Law 50 (1979) 117 et seq. 
have also allowed agencies, ministries and departments other than Foreign Offices or State 
Departments (I will refer to these generically as Foreign Ministries) to enter into them. As a result, 
their use seems to have expanded enormously (precise statistics are hard to come by though), in 
particular their use by sub-state divisions. 
The present paper takes a step back from the discussion concerning their legal status (vel non), 
and aims to trace how the idea of MoUs came to the fore. In other words, I am not sketching that 
MoUs are ontologically impossible (although they are); nor do I wish to set out that Fawcett’s 
article was based on reasoning of doubtful quality (although it was) or that the practical 
advantages of MoUs largely dissipate upon closer scrutiny (although they do). My interest, 
instead, is in trying to understand how the international legal profession, practicing and academic, 
came to think of MoUs as a viable and popular alternative to the time-honoured treaty. This story 
tells us something about how the ‘right’ academic paper at the ‘right’ time can generate a 
considerable amount of influence on the profession and therewith become a manifestation of 
expert governance. 
By any standard, MoUs are a relatively recent phenomenon, first endorsed only in the 1950s. I will 
start by briefly (all too briefly) discussing the state of the art up to the early 1950s (section II), and 
thereafter discuss the academic article that triggered this minor revolution in how we think about 
the creation of international obligations and such things as pacta sunt servanda: Fawcett’s ‘The 
Legal Character of International Agreements’, published in 1953 (section III). The subsequent 
section (section IV) will delve into the drafting history of the definition of treaty contained in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties while focusing on Fawcett’s seminal piece, while section 
V discusses the further development of the discussion during the 1980s – for these were the 
formative years of the Memorandum of Understanding. Section VI discusses why MoUs became so 
popular, while Section VII concludes. This ‘genealogy’, if that is the proper term to use, aspires to 
illustrate that it is possible for a single academic author to change the way an entire discipline 
thinks. This is remarkable in its own right, but what makes it even more remarkable are two 
additional circumstances: the circumstance that the article concerned was not, by any standard, a 
very good article, and that it made waves despite being undermined by ‘empirical’ evidence, both 
contemporaneous and later.  
What follows may not easily fit into a particular genre or discipline of scholarship. While drawing 
on some historical source material, it does not profess to be a contribution to legal history. While 
discussing the legal status of MoUs, it does not purport to be a doctrinal study of that 
phenomenon; and while classifying Fawcett’s contribution as an exercise of authority, it does not 
claim to be a contribution to political science. My interest resides, instead, in combining insights 
from various disciplines in the hope of tracing how the influence exercised by Fawcett’s article was 
established. 
One terminological matter needs to be clarified from the outset. There is a considerable difference 
of opinion, and therewith of understanding, as to the relevance of the term MoU as designation of 
an international agreement. Some authorities suggest that the use of the label MoU signifies that 
states intend create a politically binding but not legally binding instrument; others, deriving 
considerable support from the practices of states and international organizations, are less 
certain.17 It would seem that while some states think the label MoU is determinative (the UK is the 
most prominent example), most agree that an MoU can also contain a legally binding instrument: 
nomen is far from omen, so to speak. It is not necessary for present purposes to take sides once 
and for all; suffice it to say that my use of the term MoU in this paper signifies an agreement 
between states (and with or between international organizations) that is eventually considered 
not to be legally binding, and thus, presumptively, politically binding – in line with Fawcett’s 
argument. This is not a category whose existence I am convinced of, whether ontologically or 
epistemologically, but it is the category used in international legal discourse, and thus of relevance 
for my discussion in this paper. It is this use of the term that is significant for present purposes; the 
other usage is merely one among a wide variety of possible designations for treaties.18 
 
 
II. The Intellectual Non-history of the MoU 
 
The writings of authors attributed with parentage of international law tend not to differentiate 
between the various kinds of agreements states could possibly conclude. Or rather, the founding 
fathers of modern international law and their progeny would make distinctions, but none of these 
would concern or affect the legal force of the instruments they discussed. An agreement between 
                                                        
17 Even Aust, who is strongly inclined to hold that the designation MoU signifies an intention not to be legally bound, 
concedes that one must be ‘extremely careful’ when evaluating the status of an MoU, for ‘sometimes one will find a 
treaty called a Memorandum of Understanding’. A. Aust (note 7) 25.  
18 Denys P. Myers, The Names and Scopes of Treaties, American Journal of International Law 51 (1957) 574 et seq. 
states would simply, and always, be a treaty and be legally binding, although different kinds of 
treaties were typically identified. 
Take, e.g., Grotius’ classic On the Law of War and Peace, written almost 400 years ago. Grotius 
distinguishes between different types of instruments, but it did not occur to him that states could 
conclude an agreement and somehow not think of it as a legal instrument. Thus, Grotius held that 
kings could make promises, and was unhappy with the suggestion that these would only bind by 
virtue of the law of nature and not also under municipal law; this, he felt, was a ‘very obscure way 
of speaking.’19 And while Grotius distinguished between treaties and what he referred to as 
‘sponsions’, it was clear that the distinction never meant to refer to differentiation in terms of 
effects. In fact, for Grotius, the ‘sponsion’ (the term has its origins in Roman law) is an agreement 
requiring ratification, most likely because the negotiating agent may not have been duly 
empowered.20  
In the almost one and a half century between Grotius’ writings and those of Emer de Vattel, 
sometimes considered his antipode,21 nothing much had changed. Like Grotius, Vattel discussed a 
number of different possible instruments but, like Grotius, he too never thought of the possibility 
that agreements could be concluded and aspire to create a new normative situation between the 
parties, yet be something other than a treaty. He introduced all sorts of distinctions, including 
distinctions between treaties and contracts, between treaties proper and those which barely 
contain promises to do no injury, between treaties and alliances, and between personal and real 
treaties, but at no point did he see fit to make a distinction concerning the binding nature (vel non) 
of the undertaking concerned.22 
The same applied, another century and a half later, to the popular writings of Lassa Oppenheim.23 
Oppenheim’s work, avidly read in legal chancelleries all over the world, contains not a trace of 
thinking about MoUs. As in Grotius and Vattel, several different sorts of treaties are discussed, but 
none of them is considered to be anything other than legal in nature. In particular, Oppenheim 
                                                        
19 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (Stephen Neff ed.), 2012 [1625], Book II, ch. 14, para. 6. 
20 Ibid., Book II, ch. 15, para 16. Hollis suggests, without spelling it out, that Grotius may have considered sponsions as 
political commitments; there is however, no shred of evidence for this proposition in Grotius’ writings. See Duncan 
Hollis, ‘Preliminary Report on Binding and Non-binding Agreements’, OEA/Ser. Q. CIJ/doc. 542/17 corr. 1, at 103, 
footnote 21. 
21 Van Vollenhoven does not hold his punches and claims that Vattel ‘betrayed’ the thoughts of Grotius, and gave the 
Grotian system the ‘kiss of Judas’. Cornelis van Vollenhoven, De drie treden van het volkenrecht, 1918, 24-25. 
22 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Béla Kapossy/Richard Whatmore eds.), 2008 [1758], respectively paras. 154, 
171,174, 183. 
23 Oppenheim’s influence is well-sketched in Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International 
Law, 2013. 
may have been among the first to posit a distinction between law-making treaties and other 
treaties, but without belabouring the point and without suggesting that some would be more 
‘binding’ or more ‘legal’ than others. Interestingly for present purposes, to his mind treaties were 
legally binding because of a rule to this effect: pacta sunt servanda. And pacta sunt servanda, he 
held, derived from state interests as well as from religious and moral reasons, ‘for no law could 
exist between nations if such rule did not exist.’24 Indeed, before the emergence of modern 
international law and the pacta sunt servanda norm, religious and moral sentiments contributed 
to the sanctity of treaty commitments.25 
Much the same applies to other writers, including McNair, possibly the greatest authority on the 
law of treaties until the conclusion of the Vienna Convention. Publicists may have made all sorts of 
distinctions, but the idea of an agreement concluded between states with a view to regulating 
their mutual behaviour but somehow not subjected to international law, had simply not arisen. 
McNair, e.g., distinguished between conveyance-like, contractual, law-making, and institutional 
agreements;26 made a proper distinction between inter-state treaties and inter-state contracts,27 
and happily acknowledged the existence of pacta de contrahendo,28 but at no point considered 
the possibility that agreements between states might be anything other than legal instruments.29   
In other words, throughout the history of international law, there existed a comfortable unanimity 
among international lawyers, something coming close to a veritable paradigm even in the 
restrictive meaning given to that term by the philosopher of science who popularized it:30 an 
agreement between states is a treaty, however named, and thus creative of legal rights and legal 
obligations if any are identifiable. In other words: agreements between states were considered, by 
definition, to be binding under international law. It is possible, of course, that the sense of legal 
                                                        
24 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 1905, 520. The sentiment was echoed half a century later by Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, holding that pacta sunt servanda is a rule of natural law in the sense that it could not be 
otherwise: ‘The idea of servanda is inherent and necessary in the term pacta.’ See Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some 
Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law, in F.M. van Asbeck et al. (eds), Symbolae Verzijl, 1958, 
153 et seq., 164 (italics in original – NN). 
25 L. Oppenheim (note 24), 517. 
26 See in particular his The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, first published in 1930 and reproduced 
in A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1961, 739 et seq. 
27 See A.D. McNair (note 26), 4-5, suggesting that a deal between Argentina and the UK on beef import based on a 
standard contract in the meat trade, would likely be governed by the terms of that contract, not by international law.  
28 A.D. McNair (note 26), 27-29. 
29 Likewise, Basdevant discussed the emergence of all sorts of instruments other than treaties, and generally less 
solemn than treaties, but without distinguishing between legally binding and non-legally binding: see Jules Basdevant, 
La conclusion et la rédaction des traités et des instruments diplomatiques autres que les traités, Recueil des Cours 15 
(1926/V) 533 et seq. 
30 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn, 1970. 
obligation was different for Grotius than it is today; it is possible that the understanding of ‘legal 
obligation’ is not constant over time and throughout history. But it is nonetheless striking that no 
distinction was made between the ‘politically binding’ and the ‘legally binding’ before Fawcett. 
The distinctions made by Grotius or by McNair and those writing in the intervening years were all 
distinctions within law, so to speak, taking for granted the existence of one single normative order 
to be utilized intentionally: the legal order. What made Fawcett’s argument so radical was 
precisely his break with this underlying epistemological assumption.    
There simply was, at the time, no other category available, and sociologist Emile Durkheim 
provides a glimpse as to how this state of affairs – the inextricable bond between agreement and 
law - could have come about. In a set of lectures delivered repeatedly around the turn of the 
twentieth century but only published posthumously, he discusses the origins of the modern state 
(and therewith of law) as residing in property. Property, in turn, was considered to have divine 
origins, and was thus sacred. Property could not just change hands, but was linked to ritual: one 
emanation (for better or worse) is the ritual of carrying the bride across the threshold into her 
new home: the ritual marks a partial change in ownership. Property could only be transferred (if 
not by inheritance) by contract – but in order to do justice to the sacred nature of property, the 
transaction itself had to be sacred in nature as well; it had to tap into religious rites and rituals, 
which in later times came to be manifested in such things as sharing a drink or sharing a meal to 
seal a deal, or the handshake to close the deal, and other formalities. The formalities are a residue 
of these ancient rituals, and were preceded by more dramatic rituals, including the sharing of 
blood or the exchange of oaths. Durkheim was well in tune with the increasing de-formalization 
and the increasing relevance of commercial exchanges – the rise of exchange, he notes earlier, is 
the reason why the economic sphere has no professional ethics of its own (unlike, say, professions 
such as that of the lawyer or the doctor), even in his days, but the message was nonetheless clear: 
the binding force of contract was somehow related to the sacred origin of transactions: ‘Juridical 
formalism is only a substitute for sacred formalities and rites.’31 In doing so, Durkheim sketches an 
almost metaphysical bond between law and morality, a bond which seems to reject the possibility 
of anything less sacred intervening; it is precisely because of this strong bond that a looser 
category – the category of ‘politically binding’ but not ‘legally binding’ - was unthinkable. 
                                                        
31 Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Cornelia Brookfield transl.), 1992, 187. 
With respect to the conclusion of international agreements, much the same would apply. Treaties 
are generally considered as contracts between states, and even the modern Vienna Convention is 
strongly based on contractual analogies – it is decidedly less useful with respect to agreements 
with quasi-legislative ambitions, such as human rights conventions.32 Naturally, the same kind of 
thinking that struck Durkheim was transplanted to the conclusion of treaties, complete with 
sealing the binding nature of treaties with oaths, or exchanges of hostages, and the pomp and 
circumstance manifested by testimonia.33 As with contracts, the bargain reflects something 
vaguely sacred; as a result, the rituals of the law were involved by necessity, and international 
agreements would by definition be considered as legally binding, as governed by international law 
– how could it be otherwise? To this state of affairs there were only two very minor exceptions. 
The first of those was the possibility that states would agree to have an agreement concluded 
between states but governed not by international law, but by some system of domestic law, be it 
the domestic law of one of the parties, or the domestic law of a third party. Undertakings of a 
commercial nature (think of renting embassy premises, e.g., or the sale of military equipment) 
could be given this form. The point to note though, in light of the later discussion, is that this in no 
way entailed a de-activation of law: the parties could decide to have their agreements governed 
either by one of two possible systems, either by international law or by domestic law, but in both 
cases the agreement would be legally binding. 
The other exception is more interesting at first sight in that it seems to be an early form of MoU, 
but eventually proves a little deceptive as an antecedent to the notion of MoUs. It concerned a 
category that gained some popularity and notoriety towards the latter part of the nineteenth 
century: the gentlemen’s agreement. These were, and still are, said to be agreements that do not 
bind their states, but merely the persons who concluded them, à titre personnel. In an important 
sense, however, gentlemen’s agreements were the result of improvisation and existed, so to 
speak, by default. Typically, the agreements generally considered to be gentlemen’s agreements in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were politically so sensitive that they were 
initially concluded in secret. 
                                                        
32 Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat the Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Toward Manifest Intent, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 34 (2001) 283 et seq. 
33 The testimonium is the part of a treaty listing the date of conclusion and the names of the parties and their 
representatives. 
It concerned instruments34 such as the 1904 entente cordiale, representing a rapprochement 
between the United Kingdom and France (involving Lord Lansdowne and the French ambassador 
to London, Paul Cambon), which upset Germany and gave France and the UK a sphere of 
uncontested influence in Africa as well – not something to shout from the rooftops perhaps, and 
preferably kept secret. Another example was the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, concluded 
between US Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Japan’s viscount Ishii Kikujiro, which provided 
for US recognition of Japanese interests in China, especially in Manchuria – again not something to 
shout from the rooftops.35 At some point the existence of these agreements became public 
knowledge, however, which created politically awkward situations for the states concerned, and 
responsible statesmen could do only one thing: to save their states from opprobrium, they could 
only claim that the agreement was never meant to bind the state, but was the sole responsibility 
of those statesmen. They would shield their states by claiming that it was only their personal 
honour, their moral standing, that was at stake. It was only much later that the term gentlemen’s 
agreement started to be used as a way of designating non-legally binding agreements.36 
If classical international law until far into the twentieth century did not think of distinguishing 
between legally binding agreements (treaties) and agreements deemed to bind in some other way 
or in some other normative system, one may legitimately wonder when and how this change 
came about, and one way of trying to find this out is by tracing the steps the literature has taken. 
Those writing about the law of treaties seem to have generally accepted the existence of MoUs, 
and one leading example is the popular textbook written by Anthony Aust, which even devoted an 
entire chapter to MoUs as well as an annex facilitating the identification thereof. Intellectually, 
much of this is based on an earlier contribution by Aust, an oft-referred-to article in the venerable 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, published in 1986. This too refers to some earlier 
writings by others: Eisemann’s analysis of gentlemen’s agreements, for instance, but mostly, both 
in quantitative and qualitative terms, an article written by J.E.S. Fawcett more than three decades 
earlier. It is this article that receives more cites than anything else cited by Aust but, more 
importantly, it is this article that seems to provide Aust with the main intellectual justification – 
whenever a legally relevant claim is made (e.g. that by including a provision on dispute settlement 
                                                        
34 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, 1996. 
35 Manchuria would in the 1930s be occupied by Japan; by then, the agreement had already been replaced by a 
different one, but the damage had been done. 
36 Seminal is Eisemann who, to be sure, uses a broad notion of gentlemen’s agreements. See Pierre-Michel Eisemann, 
Le gentlemen’s agreement comme source du droit international, Journal du Droit International 106 (1979) 326 et seq. 
in an agreement, the parties intend to create a legally binding document), reference is made to 
Fawcett.37 Thus, there may be merit in subjecting Fawcett’s article to closer scrutiny, all the more 
so as this seems to be where the idea about MoUs was first formulated: Fawcett does not refer to 
much previous work that could be considered of relevance. 
 
 
III. The Origins of the MoU: Fawcett’s Classic Contribution 
 
When the International Law Commission (ILC) contemplated working on what would become the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the underlying idea was largely one of solidifying 
and codifying the existing law, with some further clarification and streamlining needed on topics 
such as ratification and accession,38 and perhaps most importantly figuring out what to do with 
treaty reservations, a topic on which different approaches vied for prominence and where 
traditional approaches seem difficult to align with an emerging international human rights 
regime.39 Hence, the inspiration behind the codification of the law of treaties was, to a large 
extent, to enhance legal certainty. 
In this light, it is not a little ironic that it was precisely the attempt to codify the law of treaties that 
sparked discussions on MoUs – and eventually generated uncertainty. It seemed reasonable that a 
convention on the law of treaties would require a definition of the phenomenon it aimed to 
regulate; it seemed reasonable that a ‘treaty on treaties’40 needs to figure out what the object of 
its attention is, even if only for purposes of that convention itself.41 The problem then, not 
unfamiliar but probably not often enough recognized, is that few definitions can be airtight and 
precise. It was one thing, for centuries, to view agreements between states and conceive of them 
as treaties, but in trying to describe the phenomenon, it is easy to run into problems. This applies 
                                                        
37 See, e.g., Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 35 (1986) 787 et seq., 802. 
38 There were considered somewhat uncertain in the 1940s and 1950s: see e.g. J. Mervyn Jones, Full Powers and 
Ratification, 1946. 
39 It was the tension between the classic idea of unanimous approval of reservations versus the universal ambitions of 
human rights law that sparked Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (advisory opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 15. 
40 The phrase, obvious as it is, was coined by Richard D. Kearney/Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, American 
Journal of International Law 64 (1970) 495 et seq. 
41 Whether it was strictly necessary to define ’treaty’ is open to debate: the drafters could possibly have chosen for a 
more passive approach, circumventing any definition, in much the same way as the ILC’s articles on responsibility (of 
states as well as of international organizations) do not contain a definition of responsibility. 
to every day material objects: most people will be able to recognize such things as eye glasses 
(spectacles) – we will know them when we see them. But how to describe them in such a way as 
to make clear that it is spectacles we are talking about, rather than magnifying glasses, or 
binoculars, or telescopes or microscopes or the old lorgnette? These are all similarly construed 
and perform much the same function, yet are different from spectacles. Things are much more 
difficult still with non-material objects or abstract concepts, including the concept of treaty.  
Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, Oppenheim inadvertently made clear what the 
problem was when attempting to define the notion of ‘treaty’. To his mind, treaties are 
‘conventions or contracts between two or more States concerning various matters of interest.’42 
As far as definitions go, his was a brief and succinct one, but not particularly useful: in order to 
know what a treaty is, one would have to know what conventions or contracts between states are 
and these, in turn, were (and are) generally considered to be much the same thing as treaties, 
allowing for considerable circularity in Oppenheim’s definition. Moreover, one can also 
contemplate the existence of things between states concerning matters of interest which have 
some legal effect but which are not treaties: a joint statement e.g., or perhaps a decision by the 
proper organ of an international organization.43 
As a result, it quickly transpired that the notion of treaty could not plausibly be defined except 
under reference to the intentions of states. Lauterpacht’s first report to the ILC, preparing for 
what was to become the Vienna Convention, made clear that referring to intent seemed to be the 
most obvious – perhaps the only – way of defining treaty, as somehow an instrument between 
states intended to create legal rights and obligations under international law. And the reference to 
intent was deemed necessary because there had always been the possibility of submitting inter-
state agreements to a domestic legal order;44 hence, a more objective definition referring merely 
to treaties as inter-state agreements but without referring to intent, would carry insufficient detail 
- it would fail to distinguish between treaties and private law undertakings between states. 
                                                        
42 L. Oppenheim (note 24), 517. 
43 Even in his day, international organizations having such powers existed. The International Sugar Union e.g. had the 
power to set prices, and could be conceptualized as a grouping of states. On the International Sugar Union, see Francis 
B. Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, 1919, 117-131. 
44 The same problematique would later recur with respect to internationalized contracts, i.e. agreements between a 
state and a private party, e.g. arranging for oil concessions. These can also be submitted to either of the two legal 
systems, and often opt for a mixture of the two. A thoughtful study is Esa Paasivirta, Participation of States in 
International Contracts, 1990. 
The problem then turned out to be that defining treaty in terms of the intention to have the treaty 
be governed by international law opened the door for other concepts, and that door was kicked 
wide open by Fawcett’s highly influential, paradigm-shifting article. Fawcett was, in all likelihood, 
the first to realize that if an agreement comes to be seen as a treaty because it is intended to be 
governed by international law, then it might also be possible to have an agreement that is not 
intended to be governed by international law, or create rights and obligations but without the 
intention to submit the agreement containing them to international law. This was indeed 
Fawcett’s main point: he maintained that international law insisted on a dual intent, on two 
separate expressions of intent. The first of these was an intention to create rights and obligations. 
This would, in the highly charged political environment of international relations, result in an 
agreement which, given that it was concluded between political actors, would be considered 
politically binding. But it clearly transpired that for Fawcett, concluding a politically binding 
agreement would merely be a starting point: in order to turn it into a legally binding agreement, a 
second expression of intent was required. This second intention would have to be not merely an 
intention to create rights and obligations, but a further intention to submit these rights and 
obligations to the international legal order – only then could an agreement properly be called a 
treaty. 
This differed fundamentally from earlier ideas. Traditionally, as suggested above, the creation of 
rights and obligations was only thought possible in a legal order to begin with: it was, and in a way 
still is, unorthodox to speak of rights and obligations in a context other than legal. In other words, 
most lawyers (and quite a few non-lawyers as well, we may presume) almost automatically 
associate terms such as rights and obligations with legal thinking. Legal thinking may not have had 
a monopoly on this usage, in that moral theorists sometimes posit a moral right to some good45, 
or a moral obligation to do something or abstain from doing something. But moral theorists rarely, 
if ever, suggest that the existence of a moral right or a moral obligation can depend on the 
intentions of actors concluding an agreement: we may have a moral obligation to rescue a 
drowning person when we are in a position to do so, but the moral obligation to rescue a 
drowning person owes nothing to any agreement between the victim and the rescuer – it exists 
independently from any agreement, and indeed independently from any legislative intention. And 
a moral right, while it may possibly be reinforced by a promise, typically does not stem from the 
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individual intentions of the promisor either, except in a class of highly trivial cases. Concretely put, 
if someone promises not to torture other people, the promise is at best bolstering an already 
existing moral right to be free from torture or moral obligation not to commit torture. The only 
setting where a promise may lead to a specific moral right on the part of the promise consists of 
such promises as a promise to be taken to lunch, and even here the right is parasitical on the 
underlying moral obligation that one should keep one’s promises.  
But the truly revolutionary part in Fawcett’s thinking was the idea that a special intention was 
needed to turn political agreements (i.e., all agreements) into legally binding treaties. As he put it 
with some aplomb, ‘there is no presumption that States, in concluding an international 
agreement, intend to create legal relations at all’, and he proceeded to state ‘that this intention 
must be clearly manifested before a legal character is attributed to the agreement.’46 The mere 
intention to create rights and obligations, despite their association with legal thinking and the law, 
was not considered sufficient – something additional was needed. In effect, this reversed the 
prevailing presumption: earlier thinkers had considered that an intention to create rights and 
obligations could be presumed to result in a treaty; after all, no meaningful alternatives were 
available to begin with (other than domestic contract law), and surely the creation of rights and 
obligations must be intentional,47 and thus it followed that rights and obligations amounted to 
treaties. This left the possibility for rebuttal, for those rare cases where an agreement would not 
be creative of rights or obligations but, perhaps, hypothetically, merely record a state of affairs,48 
or for those rare occasions where the rights or obligations would fully depend on voluntary 
compliance.49 
The question then arises why Fawcett suggested that the presumption could be reversed: what 
was his argument for suggesting that special intent was required? And how was it substantiated? 
                                                        
46 J. Fawcett (note 15), 385. 
47 This in turn draws on the presumed moral autonomy of actors: if we (or our states) are considered morally 
autonomous, then a good case can be made for the necessity of our consent as the basis of rights and obligations, and 
given our moral autonomy, our consent needs to be based on our intentions.  
48 It is difficult to see how this work though: an agreement to record a state of affairs tends to offer recognition of this 
state of affairs, and therewith cast a shadow of the future: recording that Russia controls Crimea tends to bestow 
recognition on Russia’s control of Crimea, and immunizes Russia’s claim against legal attacks. Therewith, it is creative 
of rights and obligations in some sense, even if the language of rights and obligations is not specifically used. 
49 There is one example from the case-law of what was then still the European Court of Justice, where the Court held 
that an EU-US agreement stipulating that compliance was to be achieved on a voluntary basis meant that the 
agreement failed to meet the threshold for being a treaty. The case concerned is case C-233/02, France v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:173, and is briefly discussed in Jan Klabbers, International Courts and Informal International Law, in 
Joost Pauwelyn/Ramses Wessel/Jan Wouters (eds.), Informal International Lawmaking, 2012, 219 et seq, 234. 
On closer scrutiny, his argument was virtually non-existent. It boiled down to saying that while 
private law contracts could be presumed binding on the individuals concluding them, the same 
logic could not apply to states, for ‘States and Governments differ greatly from individuals in the 
type of business they transact …’.and among these differences ‘not least’ was the ‘manifest lack of 
any intention that they should constitute legal obligations or that the agreed minutes or 
memoranda in which they are embodied should be regarded as contractual instruments …’.50 The 
argument here strikes as facile and more than a little circular: somehow states were sovereigns, 
and thus somehow important, and from there it followed that the legally binding force of treaties 
could not merely be presumed upon the creation of rights and obligations, but had to be 
demonstrated with the help of a second, separate intention: the intention to create legally binding 
relations. Moreover, it ignores that in the normal course of events, private parties do not have a 
separate intention to submit their agreement to contract law: few people buying a loaf of bread or 
boarding the subway even realize that they are entering into a contractual engagement.51 And 
with some innuendo Fawcett further suggested that international agreements generally differ 
from private law contracts ‘in that their provisions may sometimes be expressions not of 
agreement but of artfully formulated disagreement.’52  
This begged the question. It suggested that international agreements are not really agreements, 
and should thus not be considered legally binding, but without indicating why states would resort 
to ‘artfully disguised disagreement’. This was all the more puzzling as Fawcett seemed also to 
think that what sets agreements between states apart from contracts between individuals is that 
administrative cooperation (‘the whole field of joint administrative and technical enterprise’53) is 
not in the nature of a private law transaction. But surely administrative cooperation cannot be 
based on ‘artfully disguised disagreement’, for if there is disagreement, no matter how artfully 
disguised, there will be no cooperation; one might expect artful disagreement in connection with 
ambitious policy declarations, but not so much with administrative cooperation which, if it is to be 
meaningful, is supposed to proceed as agreed. Put differently, administrative cooperation is 
unlikely to be based on fundamental disagreement, artfully disguised or otherwise. Moreover, 
Fawcett’s argument blithely ignores the circumstance that state sovereignty is protected at any 
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Sociological Review 28 (1963) 55 et seq.  
52 J. Fawcett (note 15), 381. 
53 J. Fawcett (note 15), 386. 
rate by such institutions as signature and ratification: the chances that a state will stumble into a 
treaty by accident, against its sovereign will, must be close to non-existent.54 
This in turn suggests that Fawcett may have had different motives, and indeed his article indicates 
that he was not so much worried about a state becoming legally bound, but rather more so about 
states being subjected to compulsory dispute settlement procedures. At some point he even 
proclaimed that ‘a legal obligation differs from other obligations only in the prescribed mode of its 
enforcement.’55 Here too he may have overdramatized the danger: states are free to provide in 
their treaties that the instruments in question may not be invoked before an international court or 
tribunal,56 and at any rate, the overwhelming majority of treaties never ends up being applied by 
an international tribunal. International litigation is scarce (relative to the size of the corpus of 
international law) to begin with before general tribunals, and the more specialized among these 
tribunals all have their own sources of applicable law - think of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which serves as the applicable law for the European Court on Human Rights, or the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which does much the same for the ICC.57 Hence, the 
risk of being dragged before these courts on the basis of a treaty other than one establishing it is 
close to zero.58  
Still, identifying ‘law’ with ‘enforcement’ (and more precisely: judicial enforcement) provides an 
important clue as to Fawcett’s mindset: for him, law was eventually only law if it could be judicially 
enforced. On such an assumption, there is indeed little sense in suggesting that all kinds of 
agreements are really legally binding, for such a designation has no meaning in the absence of 
enforcement mechanisms. In a world of sovereign states, one can expect nothing else than that 
states specifically indicate their desire to become legally bound, i.e. submit their agreements to 
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VCLT), and economic or political pressure in a world of political and economic inequality is unavoidable. 
55 J. Fawcett (note 15), 397. 
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gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from the US, UK and Russia. The instrument is 
designated Memorandum and was not supposed to ‘enter into force’ but, instead, to ‘become applicable’. See further 
Thomas D. Grant, The Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994: Political Engagement or Legal Obligation?, Polish 
Yearbook of International Law 34 (2014) 89 et seq. 
the possibility, however remote, of judicial enforcement. The state of nature, to use Hobbesian 
inspiration, does not recognize a legal order; consequently, the only thing that can matter is the 
intention of each and every individual state at each and every individual occasion. 
Surprisingly perhaps, given his assumptions, there were, for Fawcett, a few classes of instruments 
that in virtue of their topic would be legally binding, regardless of specific authorial intentions.59 
These included agreements of a private law nature but also, more interestingly for present 
purposes, agreements ‘operating within the framework of accepted rules of international law or 
State practice’, at first sight a mystical category which can comprise everything and for which he 
gave consular conventions as an example. And more interesting still was his opinion that treaties 
establishing the constitutions of international organizations would by definition (or so it seems – 
he was not always very lucid in his writing) be legally binding – one can only wonder what he 
would have made of entities such as the Council of Baltic Sea States (supposedly non-legal and 
devoid of legal personality, but with a Secretariat having separate legal personality) or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), likewise supposed to be non-legal but 
a proud party to several recently concluded agreements on privileges and immunities.60 
While in retrospect it is abundantly clear that Fawcett’s fears were rather over-dramatized, it is 
perhaps no surprise that it took someone like Fawcett to invent the idea of a separate intention to 
submit agreements to international law – separate, that is, from creating rights and obligations. 
Fawcett, born in 1913, joined the UK Foreign Office (its Foreign Ministry) after having been in the 
military during World War II.61 He stayed with the Ministry for about five years, having been 
posted to the mission to the United Nations and in that capacity having been close to the drafting 
of instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration, to the 
impressionable and still fairly young government lawyer Fawcett, may well have seemed rife with 
dangerous possibilities, its non-binding nature as a General Assembly resolution notwithstanding. 
Moreover, it was around the Universal Declaration that discussions on intent to be legally bound 
first took center stage: as a resolution it could not have binding force, and this in turn paved the 
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Agreement at a Time, International Organizations Law Review 14 (2017) 414 et seq. (discussing the recently concluded 
headquarters agreement between Poland and the OSCE). For a comprehensive review, see Mateja Steinbrück 
Platise/Carolyn Moser/Anne Peters (eds.), The Legal Framework of the OSCE, 2019. 
61 There is not much biographical detail available; such little as is produced here has been culled mainly from Sir 
Robert Jennings, Fawcett, Sir James Edmund Sandford (1913-1991), in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
www.oxforddnb.com, accessed 18 October 2019, and from the obituary written by Sir Ian Brownlie, In Memoriam 
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way for making a distinction between legally binding and non-legally binding instruments, and for 
thinking that it might be possible to intend to be bound in ways other than legal. The unthinkable, 
quite literally, had become thinkable.62 
Upon leaving the Foreign Ministry, Fawcett went into private practice for a while, maintaining an 
affiliation with Oxford University, before he joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as its 
legal counsel in 1955.63 Upon his return from Washington, and following a brief interval, he 
became a member of the European Commission of Human Rights for more than two decades, and 
served as its President for a decade. This made him well-placed to write a commentary on the 
European Convention, which he duly did,64 having a little earlier written a general introductory 
textbook on international law.65 Simultaneously, as membership of the Commission was only a 
part-time position, he remained active in academic settings, e.g. as director of Chatham House, 
and as a professor of international law at King’s College for a handful of years. 
His main intellectual testament arguably was a slender book, published in 1981, when he was in 
his late sixties, titled Law and Power in International Relations. This brought a number of themes 
together, and rarely has a book title been this accurate. The focal point of the study was the 
subject of international relations, and it is perhaps worth recalling that this is a focal point rarely 
adopted by international lawyers – and was considerably less obvious still in Fawcett’s days, when 
inter-disciplinary scholarship was rarely seen: the book aspires to say something about 
international relations, more than anything else. And as its title makes clear, what mattered was 
not only the role played by law in international relations, but also the role of power – and power, 
again, rarely features in book titles drafted by international lawyers, other perhaps than those 
affiliated with the New Haven school.66 In fact, the book exemplifies the general conviction on 
Fawcett’s part that law ought to serve power – this is the best recipe for survival in a world of 
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65 J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations, 1968. 
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Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 1990. 
sovereign states, all out to increase their own power following principles discovered or, more 
likely, developed by so-called ‘realist’ political scientists.67 While Fawcett never became as well-
known as some of his contemporaries, and his intellectual legacy consists mostly of paving the 
way for the possibility of states concluding agreements that are considered binding but not legally 
so, he has proved influential in British and global politics in a different way: the UK’s Prime 
Minister at the time of writing (and former Foreign Minister) Boris Johnson is his grandson. 
 
 
IV. Beyond Fawcett 
 
Fawcett’s article did not immediately seem to strike a chord. Perhaps the first response was by 
Fritz Mann, who both understood and misunderstood Fawcett’s point. Mann suggested that the 
presumption offered by Fawcett (agreements do not create legal relations unless there is evidence 
suggesting they were specifically intended to do so) was untenable and ‘does not seem to do more 
than to state the obvious: all international agreements must be governed by some system of law; 
an agreement governed by no system of law is unthinkable.’68 Mann understands the relevance of 
Fawcett’s reversal of the traditional presumption and attending difficulties, but underestimates 
Fawcett’s radicalism: Fawcett precisely aspired to think what Mann held to be unthinkable, tried 
to have agreements governed by something but not by law.  Mann’s conclusion was 
straightforward: because Fawcett’s presumption embodied the unthinkable, it would ‘always and 
automatically be rebutted’69, and thus be no good as a presumption, for a presumption that will 
always and automatically be rebutted does no work. But this critique partly missed its target. 
If Mann missed the target, McNair hardly acknowledged its existence. McNair’s magnum opus, as 
published in 1961 (and thus almost a decade after Fawcett’s article) acknowledges the possibility 
of states making political declarations, but it is unclear whether this is to be received as an 
endorsement of Fawcett’s position. There are two circumstances which cast some doubt on the 
idea that he followed Fawcett when claiming that states can issue declarations of policy which 
they regard as politically or morally binding. First, McNair mentions Fawcett’s piece in the 
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68 F.A. Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, British Yearbook of International Law 33 (1957) 20 et seq., 
31. 
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bibliography to the pertinent first chapter of Law of Treaties, but does not specifically refer to it in 
the footnotes. Second, and more important perhaps, the one example provided by McNair70 is 
that of the 1941 Atlantic Charter, concluded by US President Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill – but that is by its wording alone not particularly rich in commitments. The 
Atlantic Charter mostly calls upon third states to respect self-determination, freedom of the seas, 
access to trade and raw materials, economic collaboration, and secure boundaries, and given the 
pacta tertiis rule,71 it is obvious that the UK and the US cannot commit third parties without their 
consent. The only provision that can plausibly be read as directed at the US and UK themselves is 
the first provision: a pledge to ‘seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other’. It is abundantly clear 
that with the possible exception of this first provision, the Atlantic Charter contained no 
enforceable mutual rights or obligations, and thus constitutes a poor example of the non-legally 
binding instrument or political commitment. It may have contained obligations of sorts: surely, an 
attempt by the US or UK to obstruct economic collaboration could well be deemed a violation of 
the Charter, but with language so open-ended, so soft, so reliant on good faith efforts, it is difficult 
to envisage enforcement in any accepted meaning of the term. Moreover, if Churchill’s 
recollections are to be believed, Roosevelt was markedly reluctant to submit the Atlantic Charter 
for approval to an isolationist US Senate: it was not so much that there was an active intention not 
to become legally bound on the part of both parties, but a fear that one of them might not acquire 
domestic approval.72 The other side had no such qualms, and had even registered it with the 
Secretariat of the League of Nations.73  
Little subsequent discussion took place in the literature in the years immediately following the 
publication of Fawcett’s article, and the VCLT does not address MoUs or anything closely 
resembling them. Still, this was not for lack of trying: an attempt was made to insert a distinction 
in the VCLT between treaties properly so-called, and what were referred to as ‘treaties in 
simplified form’, understood as instruments that would be more flexible, easier to conclude and 
perhaps to escape from, than treaties properly so-called.74 The attempt, however, failed, largely 
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because it proved impossible to find a plausible way of defining both. After all, their legal effects 
proved identical and they would have to be defined in well-nigh identical ways (with ‘simplified 
form’ being the only mark of distinction), so a distinction that would consider both as instruments 
governed by international law proved out of reach. It did not seem to have occurred to anyone 
just yet that the point of such simplified instruments might precisely reside in having them be 
devoid of legal effects. And had that thought occurred, then it could have been considered 
improper to address the issue (the non-legal nature of a particular class of agreements) in a 
convention dedicated to instruments with legal effects. In a sense, therewith, it is not surprising 
that the VCLT rests silent: if they are treaties after all, then the VCLT applies; if they are not 
binding, then they are ex hypothesi not treaties, and need not be addressed in the VCLT. 
But if Fawcett’s work went largely unheeded in the International Law Commission and at the 
Vienna Conference, it did not go unnoticed in the literature or, indeed, in state practice. The ILC 
may have dropped the idea of devoting a separate provision to the simplified form, as an earlier 
draft had still done,75 but the underlying distinction seemed to tap into something and would gain 
considerable popularity during the 1970s and 1980s under the heading of MoUs, together with the 
emergence of a related new phenomenon, the phenomenon of soft law. The concept of MoUs 
relied for its theoretical justification on Fawcett’s groundwork as discussed above, thin and 
incoherent as this may have been; while the soft law concept was initially invented, or so it 
seemed, to give at least some legal meaning to instruments that would formally be devoid of legal 
force, such as resolutions of the UN General Assembly or adopted by other international 
organizations. Surely, so the argument went, it must mean something when states massively 
support a certain proposition or condemn a certain practice – it may not be hard law, but can be 
devoid of legal effect altogether. 
There are two main distinctions then between soft law and MoUs: soft law represents an attempt 
to upgrade the legal value of instruments, whereas MoUs represents the aspiration to downgrade 
them; and generally speaking, soft law emanates from multilateral settings, while MoUs are 
mostly used in bilateral settings. What they share though is more important than what separates 
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them: they both share the assumption that there is something that can be normative and, what is 
more, intentionally normative, but not law.76  
Endorsements of MoUs in the literature were facilitated by initial misunderstandings or 
underestimation of the appeal of MoUs (think of Mann) or neglect (think of McNair), and 
eventually culminated in the late Anthony Aust’s 1986 piece on the theory and practice of MoUs 
(the title refers to ‘informal international instruments’), and perhaps this piece best symbolizes 
the prevailing confusion at the time. On the one hand, Aust strongly claimed, following Fawcett, 
that MoUs are politically binding because that is what their authors intend; on this line of 
reasoning, again following Fawcett, authorial intention is sacrosanct and can mostly manifest itself 
in the terminology chosen. If states use terms like ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’, or ‘come into 
operation’ instead of ‘enter into force’, then they clearly, dixit Aust, intend to create politically 
binding rather than legally binding agreements – and this was a line of thought Aust stuck to with 
great consistency over the next three decades, as witnessed by the various incarnations of his 
textbook Modern Treaty Law and Practice. 
Nonetheless, and here a certain level of inconsistency set in, Aust also upheld the proposition that 
while intent would be sacrosanct, nonetheless MoUs could acquire legal force through the 
working of such legal institutions as good faith and estoppel, protecting legitimate expectations, 
i.e. independently of intent. Yet, it is difficult to see how an agreement intended to be non-legal in 
nature could generate legally relevant legitimate expectations – surely, whatever expectations it 
would generate should also be considered extra-legal if it is true that intent is all-decisive. After all, 
if states claim that they intend to create a non-legal instrument, then it would be hypocritical of 
them later to claim that legally relevant expectations were built on such agreement, the original 
intent notwithstanding. Ironically perhaps, one could very well argue that the very resort to the 
non-legal realm would mean that states be estopped from claiming legal effects: estoppel would 
not operate to attach legal effect to non-legal instruments, but would operate to prevent states 
from claiming legal effects attaching to non-legal instruments to begin with. Accordingly, 
suggesting that legal force be acquired through good faith or estoppel entails that intent cannot 
be all-decisive, and this, in turn, undermines Aust’s very thesis about MoUs. It was here that he 
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differed from Fawcett; it was here also that Fawcett showed himself to be the more consistent 
thinker of the two.77 
 
 
V. The 1980s and Beyond 
 
Discussions on MoUs after the 1980s mostly become repetitive, and seem to have calmed down.78 
The intellectual arguments have all been voiced and heard, while state practice has been referred 
to and seems ambivalent, in that some states are happy to think of MoUs as by definition non-
legal, while others are not so sure but refuse to exclude the possibility that at least some MoUs 
can be binding, but not in law. And indeed, why would they? For states, the possibility of there 
being a normative order other than law that can be employed at will seemed like a Godsend: it 
allows them to enter into all kinds of deals, without having to consider legal formalities and 
requirements. It promises states the possibility of having their cake and eating it too: make quick 
deals with each other, without having to account for it. What, from a foreign policy-maker’s 
perspective, could be better? 
In particular, MoUs (like soft law) offer the possibility of not having to go through the trouble of 
obtaining parliamentary approval, and the possibility of not being reminded by domestic judges 
that states had committed to a questionable course of action. Besides, so it is often said, MoUs 
can not only be swiftly concluded, they can also be swiftly terminated. After all, they are not 
treaties, so it is somehow thought to follow that no notice needs to be given, nor any justification 
in case of termination.  
The downside of concluding MoUs, and more generally the move to informalization facilitated by 
MoUs, is to some extent the mirror image of the ostensible advantages. Typically, MoUs do not go 
                                                        
77 Consistency and incoherence, in turn, are generally appreciated epistemological criteria, but have little to do with 
the truthfulness or falsehood of claims. A response available to Aust (but never, as far as I am aware, utilized by him) 
would have been to acknowledge that yes, his approach was inconsistent or incoherent, but then again, so is real life 
every now and then. Being incoherent does not, on its own, necessarily mean that you are wrong. 
78 An illustration is that two relatively recent and ambitious edited volumes all but ignore the possible existence of 
MoUs: see Michael Bowman/Dino Kritsiotis (eds.), Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of 
Treaties, 2018, and Christian Tams/Antonios Tzanakopoulos/Andreas Zimmermann (eds.), Research Handbook on the 
Law of Treaties, 2014, while a recent textbook on the law of treaties treats MoUs as given without much further 
discussion, uncritically buying into Fawcett’s conception while possibly spreading further confusion: ‘If an instrument 
is not purported to have legal effects, it cannot be a treaty. … These texts are then only political agreements, 
memoranda of understanding (MOU) or gentleman’s agreements, that is, soft law. The issue is one of the choice of 
means by States.’ The words are taken from Robert Kolb, The Law of Treaties: An Introduction, 2016, 19. 
through parliamentary approval procedures, making their democratic credentials questionable. 
Equally typically (and indeed for Fawcett a core proposition) is that courts, domestic and 
international, are left behind. Courts themselves have been loath to accept this, as will be shown 
below, but the very wish to de-activate the possibility of judicial enforcement is regarded as a 
strong factor motivating the conclusion of MoUs. There is more still at stake though. Nico Krisch 
has persuasively pointed out that informalization tends to go hand in hand with increased 
hierarchy: informal regimes tend to be run by the powerful, not the under-privileged.79 Where 
Krisch found this to be the case with multilateral regimes, much the same may apply in bilateral 
relations; the point for present purposes is to suggest that Fawcett’s trouvaille has done much to 
pave the way.   
It may be objected that the advantages ascribed to MoUs listed above are spurious, as the same 
can apply to treaties, if only the parties agree. After all, nothing in the law of treaties prevents 
treaty partners from agreeing on termination without notice, and nothing prevents them from 
devising swift methods of revision either, or speedy entry into force. Indeed, treaties can very well 
be concluded without any form of domestic democratic control as far as the law of treaties is 
concerned – such approval procedures as exist are imposed by domestic law, not by the 
international law of treaties. This is not to say that the conclusion of normative instruments 
without democratic control is somehow desirable, far from it; but the point is that the law of 
treaties contains no obstacles to doing so, and if it is true that MoUs are somehow binding, even if 
only as political commitments, the proper democrat would have to insist on democratic approval 
procedures with respect to MoUs or political commitments as well – and that would undermine 
some of the alleged flexibility. 
What is surprising in all this though, and a sign that the positions have hardened and become 
articles of faith rather than the product of serious intellectual reflection, is that the case-law of 
international tribunals is systematically being ignored. And this case-law overwhelmingly suggests 
that there is no such thing as an extra-legal agreement. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
explicitly makes the point in the 1994 Qatar v Bahrain case, strongly maintaining that as soon as 
an agreed text contains an identifiable obligation, it is an agreement subject to the law of 
                                                        
79 Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Public Goods, American Journal of International 
Law 108 (2014) 1 et seq. 
treaties.80 And the brief words it spends on the issue in a later case involving the boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria is worth quoting in full, as it is a most obvious rejection of 
anything Fawcett had proposed. In connection with a declaration adopted by the Heads of State of 
Cameroon and Nigeria (known as the Maroua Declaration) but never submitted to ratification, the 
Court stated unequivocally: ‘The Court considers that the Maroua Declaration constitutes an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and tracing a boundary; it is 
thus governed by international law and constitutes a treaty in the sense of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties…’.81 
Note the Court’s use of the word ‘thus’: if there is an agreement between states, if it is in written 
form, and if it contains some sort of rights or obligations (in this case in the form of a dispositive, 
tracing a boundary), then a treaty has been concluded. There is no separate investigation into the 
intentions of the parties, and most assuredly there is no separate investigation into whether they 
actually intended to create a legal instrument as opposed to some other kind of instrument – 
creating rights or obligations ‘thus’ results in a treaty, governed by international law. 
The European Court of Justice (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) had a little earlier 
held that there is no such thing as an administrative agreement (a phenomenon often captured 
under the heading MoU), binding the parts of the administration that conclude them but not 
binding the state or international organization concerned. In this case, it involved an agreement 
between the EU’s Commission and the US Department of Justice on formalization of their anti-
trust cooperation; the Commission’s argument that this would not engage the EU on the 
international level was struck down by the Court, which suggested that any breach would engage 
the responsibility of the EU.82 While not explicitly discussing MoUs, the message seemed clear 
enough: commitment equals treaty.  
This stance was confirmed by both the EU Court and the ICJ, as well as other international 
tribunals. In the Black Sea delimitation, a succession of instruments referred to as procès-verbal 
were considered as containing rights and obligations, their designation and relative lack of 
formality notwithstanding.83 In Pulp Mills, the ICJ happily applied a most informal memorandum 
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concluded between Argentina and Uruguay, paying scant attention to what the intentions of the 
parties may have been, and much the same applies to Maritime Delimitation in the Indian 
Ocean84– neither, it should be added, did the parties to these MoUs argue their non-binding 
nature. In Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, e.g., Somalia argued something 
approximating invalidity85 of a MoU between it and Kenya due to absent authority and 
circumvention of domestic treaty-making procedures, but at no point was the suggestion raised 
that the MoU would not have been concluded in the realm of law to begin with. The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea followed the ICJ’s approach and accepted that protocols concluded 
in informal circumstances or emanating from joint commissions may well create legally binding 
rights and obligations, but whether they actually do so is dependent largely on the language used. 
On this basis, it held that some provisions of a protocol decided upon by a Japanese-Russian 
Fisheries Commission had legal force, but others did not.86  
There are also cases where courts have held that agreements contained no identifiable or 
enforceable rights or obligations, something Fawcett actually predicted without seemingly 
realizing it. To his mind, one of the hallmarks of the intention to create legal relations resided in 
the wording of the terms of an agreement; while he seemed to stipulate the need for a separate 
intent to be bound, he also seemed perfectly happy to let this depend on the wording of 
obligations – an obligation on a state to act ‘as it deems necessary’87 suggested little that could be 
enforceable, and in stipulating as much Fawcett can at the very least be accused of not really 
having thought things through.88 Be this as it may, the European Court of Justice has held that an 
agreement stipulating that compliance take place ‘on a voluntary basis’ had no legal effect, 
precisely because no obligation could be discerned.89 Following the same mode of analysis, ITLOS 
denied treaty status with respect to agreed minutes concluded in 1974 between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar, partly because of some of the persons involved in the conclusion lacked the requisite 
powers, but mostly because the text of the agreed minutes reflected no rights or obligations: it 
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literally was a record of what was discussed, and most definitely could not be seen (contrary to 
Bangladesh’s suggestion) as containing a final boundary delimitation.90 And in the notorious South 
China Sea Arbitration the tribunal devoted a lengthy analysis to a 2002 instrument, a Declaration 
on Conduct, adopted between China and ASEAN’s member states, and concluded that its wording 
suggested strongly that no rights or obligations were created; the instrument in questions mostly 
affirmed existing obligations, and aimed to pave the way for a new, binding instrument, but 
neither the words chosen nor the circumstances surrounding its conclusion supported the 
proposition that it would be a legally binding instrument nor, indeed, an instrument binding under 
politics or morality – the wording simply was not concrete enough to make the document much 
more than an ‘aspirational’ instrument.91 And whatever else it was, it was clearly not, contrary to 
China’s suggestion, a binding instrument related to dispute settlement: it did not contain anything 
precluding third party settlement of an existing dispute. The instrument was a step on the way 
towards a code of conduct to be concluded later (this never happened), but nothing more. 
If international courts and tribunals have not been very receptive to Fawcett’s thesis, neither have 
domestic courts. A study conducted a quarter of a century ago found that domestic courts have 
either treated MoUs as legally binding or, if dismissive, dismissed them for other reasons (ultra 
vires considerations, or the open-ended nature of the wording used in the agreement), and a 
recent decision from Ghana’s Supreme Court confirms much the same. Confronted with a claim to 
invalidate an agreement concluded by Ghana and the US on the settlement of two former 
Guantanamo detainees in Ghana, the Ghanaian government attempted to argue that the 
agreement at issue was not intended to create legally binding rights and obligations. This now the 
Supreme Court curtly dismissed: ‘Taking into account the substance [of the Agreement], we are in 
no doubt that, despite the form in which it has been drafted and the text couched, it is intended 
to create an obligation on the part of Ghana to the USA whereby, inter alia, Ghana binds herself to 
‘receive’ and ‘resettle’ the said two persons…’.92 
Still, Fawcett’s thesis resonated enormously in state practice, with many states having adopted 
circulars, internal instructions, and ministerial guidelines. The responsible department at Britain’s 
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Foreign Ministry e.g., the Treaty Section at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
regularly updates a document referred to as Treaties and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs): 
Guidance on Practice and Procedures, instructing civil servants how to act, what terms to use and 
what to avoid, which domestic procedures to follow, et cetera. The US Foreign Ministry (the 
Department of State) offers much the same in condensed form through its Guidance on Non-
Binding Documents,93 and the German federal government, in 2000, instructed its employees 
always to verify whether a binding treaty was really necessary or whether things could not just as 
well be arranged below the legal threshold.94 French guidelines circulated in 2010 warn that 
administrative agreements, i.e. agreements concluded between government ministers and their 
counterparts abroad may turn out to be devoid of legal effect and therewith are best avoided95 – 
thus suggesting that agreement-makers may have a say in the matter of the binding force of the 
instrument they conclude. The precise scope of the popularity of the MoU is difficult to assess, but 
that it is popular in the practice of states (though not their judicial institutions) is clear, and 
perhaps no better illustration can be given than the disclaimer on the website of the Treaty 
Section at the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, pointing out that when it registers an 
instrument as a treaty it does so without prejudice to the proper nature or status of the 
instrument: ‘It is the understanding of the Secretariat that its action does not confer on the 
instrument the status of a treaty or an international agreement if it does not already have that 
status…’.96 
 
VI. A Popular Misapprehension 
 
The popularity of the MoU should not come as a surprise, but it does demand something of an 
explanation. How could a loosely argued and rather incoherent proposition, lacking support from 
the sort of empirical evidence that is habitually thought to be relevant in legal circles (i.e., judicial 
support), nonetheless manage to become so influential? The answer will have to remain 
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speculative, but it seems that a number of different considerations and factors may have played a 
role. 
First, and probably most important, Fawcett provided practicing Foreign Ministry lawyers and 
other bureaucrats at other departments with a highly convenient new tool in their tool kit. If 
states conclude regular, legally binding agreements, such agreements often need to be approved 
by parliaments, which entails that considerable delay can take place: parliaments may have their 
own protracted procedures, and might even be reluctant to go along with what the Foreign 
Ministry or some other department proposes. In short, the policy experts can negotiate all they 
want, but if there is parliamentary scrutiny, they cannot be certain that the results of their 
negotiations will actually see the light of day – parliaments may get in the way. So for practicing 
policy-makers the invention of the non-legally binding instrument, the MoU, was an answer to 
several prayers at once. The MoU would still be binding, but without having to follow pesky 
procedures; it would guarantee that policy-makers and negotiators could get things done, without 
any outside interference leading perhaps to a watering down of the deal or even its complete 
obstruction. The managerial approach so prevalent among policy-makers thus would be assisted in 
no small measure, and of course the policy-makers recognized as much, ascribing such virtues as 
flexibility and speed to Fawcett’s newly found creation. It did not matter that the arguments for 
speed and flexibility were largely spurious, in that the same result could be achieved by concluding 
regular, legally binding treaties: the law of treaties, as seen above, places no obstacle in the way of 
managerial action.97 It is, instead, domestic constitutional law that can make the treaty-making 
process slow and cumbersome, and the MoU now offered the ideal method for setting aside 
domestic procedural requirements. After all, there is probably not a country in the world whose 
constitutional law suggests that political commitments, like legal commitments, should be 
approved by parliaments.98 And what applies to parliamentary scrutiny also applies, by and large, 
to judicial review: MoUs offer the promise of international concerted action, while simultaneously 
excluding judicial review. So one can make deals about, say, the acceptable division of refugees 
among states, without offering those refugees the possibility to enforce such a deal judicially. One 
can agree that terrorism suspects may be sent abroad and offer diplomatic assurances in MoUs 
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that no harm befalls them, without offering any guarantee of legal protection.99 And, of course, 
equally possible, Foreign Ministry lawyers could use the facility to make arrangements serving the 
greater public good, or at least their conception of it. Above it was already noted that Roosevelt 
was worried that the Atlantic Charter, this blueprint for the post-war period, might not meet with 
senatorial approval, and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act likewise may have been considered too 
volatile for parliamentary approval in some of its signatories: it was famously deemed not eligible 
for registration under Article 102 of the UN Charter, something which was expected to entail that 
it could not be relied on before any of the organs of the UN.100 Note however that it is doubtful 
that a category of non-legally binding agreements would have been necessary to serve these 
laudable community goals, and that there remains a dose of hypocrisy involved in suggesting that 
an agreement may be binding but not so as a matter of law.  
Second, it was with such considerations in mind that the practicing Foreign Ministry lawyers and 
other departmental servants found a willing ally in many an international law academic. 
International lawyers, as David Kennedy once astutely observed, have an international project:101 
they tend to favour forms of international cooperation above anything else and in ways that do 
not apply to, e.g., banking lawyers, even regardless of the contents. International lawyers want to 
see international cooperation between states, because it is engrained in their acculturation and 
socialization that international agreement is commendable, and a fine value in its own right, in 
relative isolation from substantive concerns. This ‘international project’ entails that international 
cooperation is deemed worthwhile, regardless of the purpose the cooperation serves, and this 
mindset in turn entails that all forms of cooperation must be cherished. As Christine Chinkin once 
put it in the context of soft law, but equally applicable to MoUs: a soft agreement is better than no 
agreement at all.102 Hence, the idea behind MoUs tapped into a natural coalition of interests 
between practitioners wishing to get things done, and academics wishing to elevate ‘the 
international’. 
And what helped the international law academic to support Fawcett’s proposition even against 
the insights of courts and tribunals was the circumstance that states were keen to take it up, 
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Fawcett himself suggested to be writing ‘very largely’ de lege ferenda, and started by claiming that 
a change in practice was ‘desirable’.103 This entailed, most likely, that not much practice 
concerning MoUs had yet materialized, but following his contribution, slowly but surely states 
started to resort to the faculty of concluding MoUs instead of treaties, or at least started to accept 
the possibility that MoUs could be concluded in certain circumstances. As Aust would write three 
decades later, anyone denying a distinction between treaties and MoUs offers a hypothesis that ‘is 
just not supported by the extensive practice of states.’104 This insistence on state practice is 
curious, in that what often matters to lawyers is the hermeneutic support of authoritative opinion, 
i.e. what courts say. The resort to state practice is of course a building brick of customary 
international law, but normally speaking ‘the jury is still out’ until a court confirms that the 
practice of states adds up to a legal rule. With MoUs, though, this latter part never happened, and 
there are sound theoretical arguments to claim that relying on state practice alone cannot be 
enough when it comes to the creation of legal concepts and what H.L.A. Hart referred to as 
secondary rules105 – and surely, MoUs must be seen in this category rather than as emanations of 
a primary rule of behavior on a par with ‘thou shall respect innocent passage’ and ‘thou shalt not 
commit torture’. In yet other words, state practice is dogmatically not all that relevant in the 
context of MoUs, at least not when it comes to offering a legally valid justification for their use. 
These two factors (the attraction to practitioners and normative appeal to academics) were in all 
likelihood the most important factors at play, but there were additional ones. One of these 
concerned again the perceived rigidities of the international legal system. Treaties, so the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties seemed to suggest, could only be concluded between 
states, and perhaps with or between international organizations. But obviously, states may wish to 
make all sorts of deals with other entities as well: there might be considerable political merit in 
concluding an agreement with a liberation movement, or with an indigenous people, or perhaps 
even with private sector actors, yet none of these could formally be considered treaties, since 
treaties could seemingly only involve public actors. Likewise, treaty relations with unrecognized 
states could be mutually beneficial, but seemed legally difficult and diplomatically awkward.106 
Here then the MoU came to the rescue, allowing states to conclude agreements with other actors 
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without having to be too concerned about the formal status of those other actors. And possible 
critics could always be put in their place by suggesting that a particular agreement with a 
particular non-recognized entity or liberation movement was merely a MoU, and not a full-fledged 
treaty binding the state under international law. 
Related was uncertainty concerning the scope of treaty-making powers of most international 
organizations. The constitutions of quite a few organizations envisage cooperation and 
coordination between organizations, but without spelling out the instruments through which such 
coordination or cooperation can take place, and the formal treaty-making powers of most 
international organizations are limited.107 In those circumstances, international organizations 
often resort to the conclusion of MoUs with each other, as again these can do the by now familiar 
trick: they are supposed to bind the entities on whose behalf they are concluded, but since they 
are not supposed to be binding under international law, they cannot be seen to be in tension with 
the legal powers of the organization in question. 
In short, MoUs could become a big hit because MoUs cleverly operated within the interstices of 
the international legal order, exploiting the natural coalition between practitioners and academics 
to get things done, and allowing states and international organizations to circumvent provisions 
on the proper procedure to be followed, or the proper limits to competences, or the formalities as 
regard the legal status of possible partners. And all of this worked on the mistaken thesis that the 
law of treaties represented a rigid system, which needed to be set aside in the name of the greater 
international good and this, in turn, is mostly tenable on the epistemological assumption that an 
international legal order can hardly be said to exist; and consequently, whatever legal effects the 
activities of states engender depends solely on their direct intentions. Lipson put it well when 
suggesting that in order to enforce whatever bargains they make, ‘states must act for themselves. 
This limitation is crucial; it is a recognition that international politics is a realm of contesting 
sovereign powers’,108 and does not, he might have added, constitute a legal order worthy of the 
name. On such an assumption, where all international agreements must be ‘enforced 
endogenously’109, where states are wolves to each other and life is nasty, brutish and short – in 
such a world, devoid of law, really, it may make some sense for states to keep a close reign on 
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their commitments, and suggest that the legal nature (vel non) of their agreements depends solely 
on their own intentions and owes nothing to an overarching legal order – an overarching legal 
order whose existence is denied ex hypothesi.110  
Whether this broad assumption about international affairs being nothing more than ‘a realm of 
contesting sovereign powers’ is tenable, is a different matter altogether, and at some point 
becomes an article of faith more than anything else. Suffice it to say that identifying the 
international legal order with enforcement, as Fawcett does unwittingly (it seems) and as Lipson 
does wittingly (it seems), may strike many as unpersuasive: there is so much more to international 
law than enforcement alone.111 On points of detail, moreover (the points often mentioned as 
favouring the MoU) it should be noted that the law of treaties never insists of formalities: things 
can get done speedily if only states agree. Agreements can enter into force the day of their 
conclusion; states can access international cooperative ventures by mere announcement;112 if 
treaties need to be applied speedily, states can agree to apply them provisionally. Treaties can be 
terminated on a day’s notice or even less, should states so agree, and amendment likewise can be 
arranged without the merest hint of time-consuming formalities. Such formalities as do exist stem 
from domestic constitutional law, and usually exist for good reasons, in particular the protection 
of democratic control of foreign policy. 
 
 
VII. The Nail in the Coffin 
 
MoU’s have lost some of their glamour over the last few years, and if ever a practice symbolized 
the old adage about being a victim of one’s own success, then MoUs may well qualify. Ever since 
Fawcett paved the way in his 1953 article, under-developed and under-theorized as it may have 
been, MoUs have become increasingly popular in state practice. Hard statistics are hard to come 
by, for the obvious reason that states are reluctant to publish them and prefer to operate in the 
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‘twilight zone’113 and on the ‘legally subliminal level’.114 Still, one indicator is that many Foreign 
Ministries have issued instructions to other departments and agencies pertaining to the proper 
use of MoUs, and how to distinguish them from treaties. Those same Foreign Ministries have 
started to worry though: while the conduct of foreign affairs is their primary responsibility, they 
have lost control over what other departments and agencies have been doing. This is a point that 
cannot strictly be proven, but will privately be acknowledged by many Foreign Ministry lawyers: 
the practice of concluding MoUs has gotten out of hand, to the extent that Foreign Ministries no 
longer know what has been concluded by which department or agency. Indeed, those 
departments or agencies themselves are not in full control: reportedly, it happens on occasion 
that different officials within the same department end up concluding similar MoUs with the same 
counterparts, without realizing it. And often enough, as Aust already finely noted in 1986 while 
endorsing MoUs, their conclusion may lead to ‘retrieval problems’:115 being informal, they are 
often kept outside of formal record-keeping, and never registered, neither with the UN nor with 
any domestic agreement registry. 
There may, moreover, be a second reason why foreign policy elites have lost some of their 
enthusiasm for MoUs, and this is related to the very reason for their success: MoUs exemplify the 
sort of ‘expert governance’, taking place between foreign policy elites and far from public scrutiny, 
that many so vocally complain about. For this is precisely the point of MoUs: that governance and 
regulation can be conducted by those ‘in the know’, unhampered by parliamentary scrutiny, 
judicial review, or the vagaries of public opinion. 
The truly curious point, however, is how the invisible college of international lawyers (and 
international relations scholars as well) came to accept and embrace the MoU despite the flimsy 
foundations, little more than wishful thinking, provided by Fawcett in his 1953 contribution, and 
despite also the consistent rejection of MoUs by a host of international courts and tribunals. It is 
difficult to find even a single judgment endorsing the MoU thesis despite some 70 years of 
discussion, and it is difficult to think of Fawcett’s ‘theory’ as anything else but fanciful, based on 
questionable premises and debatable logic. If the discipline of academic international law is this 
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easily persuaded to give up centuries of reasonable thought, then one can only wonder what this 
says about the discipline. 
 
 
 
 
